Equilibria in Finite Games Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by Anshul Gupta

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Date: 2016-06-17 06:57:25 Game theory Non-cooperative games Evolutionary game theory Nash equilibrium Strategy Solution concept Evolutionarily stable strategy Zero-sum game Normal-form game Folk theorem Epsilon-equilibrium		Equilibria in Finite Games Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by Anshul Gupta Add to Reading List Source URL: cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk Download Document from Source Website File Size: 1,23 MB Share Document on Facebook

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