Proof game

Results: 48



#Item
1Semantic Security Invariance under Variant Computational Assumptions Eftychios Theodorakis? and John C. Mitchell?? Abstract. A game-based cryptographic proof is a relation that establishes equivalence between probabilist

Semantic Security Invariance under Variant Computational Assumptions Eftychios Theodorakis? and John C. Mitchell?? Abstract. A game-based cryptographic proof is a relation that establishes equivalence between probabilist

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Source URL: eftychis.org

Language: English - Date: 2018-02-16 15:03:09
2If Mathematical Proof is a Game, What are the States and Moves? David McAllester  1

If Mathematical Proof is a Game, What are the States and Moves? David McAllester 1

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Source URL: cl-informatik.uibk.ac.at

- Date: 2018-03-31 16:27:01
    3Microsoft Word - Genesereth-Proof.docx

    Microsoft Word - Genesereth-Proof.docx

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    Source URL: ggp.stanford.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2013-09-12 02:44:30
    4The Garden-Hose Game and Application to Position-Based Quantum Cryptography Harry Buhrman, Serge Fehr, Christian Schaffner, Florian Speelman 12 September 2011

    The Garden-Hose Game and Application to Position-Based Quantum Cryptography Harry Buhrman, Serge Fehr, Christian Schaffner, Florian Speelman 12 September 2011

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    Source URL: www.qcrypt2011.ethz.ch

    Language: English - Date: 2011-09-18 10:01:18
    5The purpose of this note is to further generalize the smoothness framework by Roughgarden [7], in order to provide a unified proof for many existing price-of-anarchy results.  1 Bounds on the Price of Anarchy A strategic

    The purpose of this note is to further generalize the smoothness framework by Roughgarden [7], in order to provide a unified proof for many existing price-of-anarchy results. 1 Bounds on the Price of Anarchy A strategic

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    Source URL: florian-schoppmann.net

    Language: English - Date: 2016-03-04 03:20:15
    6Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai ∗

    Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai ∗

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    Source URL: agent.inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp

    Language: English - Date: 2016-07-21 01:26:20
    7Take One or Two December 2, 2015 Consider the following game. The board consists of n tokens. At each turn, a player must take either 1 or 2 tokens off the board (which are discarded). The player who takes the last token

    Take One or Two December 2, 2015 Consider the following game. The board consists of n tokens. At each turn, a player must take either 1 or 2 tokens off the board (which are discarded). The player who takes the last token

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    Source URL: math.colorado.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2015-12-04 19:21:56
    8Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources

    Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources

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    Source URL: erlanson.weebly.com

    Language: English - Date: 2016-05-25 05:22:11
    9SPECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF DAVID GALE

    SPECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF DAVID GALE

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    Source URL: gametheorysociety.org

    Language: English - Date: 2011-10-28 08:32:02
    10PROOFS OF APPENDIX A Proof of PROPOSITION A1 (pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the PUparticipation game without allied voters): The proof is a straightforward probabilistic extension of Palfrey and Rosenthal (19

    PROOFS OF APPENDIX A Proof of PROPOSITION A1 (pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the PUparticipation game without allied voters): The proof is a straightforward probabilistic extension of Palfrey and Rosenthal (19

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    Source URL: www1.feb.uva.nl

    Language: English - Date: 2007-10-30 09:26:57